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From New Thinking to the Fragmentation of Consensus m Soviet 
Foreign Policy The USSR and the Developing World1
Roger E Kanet with Garth T Katner
In the spring of 1985 when Mikhail S Gorbachev assumed the leadership of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union, relations with developing countries were still at the center of Soviet foreign policy 
Despite growing evidence of a reconsideration of this emphasis among Soviet analysts the USSR 
remained deeply involved m regional conflicts across the entire spectrum of the Third World—from 
Cambodia and Afghanistan m Asia to the Horn and Angola m Africa and Nicaragua and El Salvador m 
Central America Western analysts asserted that the role of the Soviet Union as a global power was 
based almost exclusively on its military capabilities including both command over ever more 
sophisticated nuclear and conventional armaments and expanding military involvement in Thud World 
regional conflicts Moreover in their view the military stalemate in US Soviet relations had deflected 
Soviet superpower aspirations toward the Third World 2
After 1985 the Soviet Union underwent revolutionary changes m both its domestic and its foreign 
policy In the foreign policy area the initial focus of these changes emphasized the reduction of conflict 
with the West, especially the United States as an essential element of the overall reform of Soviet 
society The result was a senes of agreements on arms limitations and a dramatic improvement m the 
international political atmosphere In addition developments in the Soviet Eastern European 
relationship throughout 1989 and 1990 were of histone importance and resulted in the collapse of 
Soviet imposed Marxist Leninist regimes m East Central Europe and the emergence of mdependent 
states as well as structural changes m the entire political secunty balance m Europe
Changes of great importance have also occurred m Soviet policy in Asia where relations with the 
Peoples Republic of China and with the Republic of Korea have been normalized Although changes 
in Soviet policy toward and relations with developmg countnes have been less dramatic than those in 
Europe they have nonetheless been of very visible and growing importance During the first six years 
after Gorbachev s rise to political prominence Soviet troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan the 
USSR supported and actively encouraged the withdrawal of Vietnamese and Cuban troops from 
Cambodia and Angola respectively and Soviet support for the Nicaraguan elections of spring 1990 
facilitated the shift of political power m that country In brief without abandoning its chief Third 
World partners the Soviet Union initiated far reaching shifts in its perceptions of the place of the Third 
World m international politics of its long term objectives in the region and of the costs that it is able 
and willing to bear in pursuing those objectives
It is the purpose of the present essay to examine the shifts m Soviet policy toward the Thud World 
that have occurred since 1945 with special consideration given to Soviet involvement in regional 
conflicts3 The gist of the argument presented is that the Soviet leadership has recognized its basic
1 This paper was originally prepared for presentation at the annual meetings of the International Studies 
Association, Vancouver BC Canada, 19 23 March 1991 It will appear as a chapter m an edited volume 
by Roger E Kanet, Deborah Nutter Miner and Tamorah J Resler The Soviet Union in the International 
Political System, Cambridge Cambridge University Press (in press) The authors wish to express their 
appreciation to Deborah Nutter Miner and Paul Marantz for their perceptive critiques of an earlier version 
of this paper
2 See for example, Paul Dibb The Soviet Union The Incomplete Superpower (Urbana University of 
Illinois Press 1986) passim
3 Two recent publications that trace these developments m detail are Edward A Kolodziej and Roger E 
Kanet, eds The Limits o f Soviet Power in the Developmg World Thermidor in the Revolutionary 
Struggle (London Macmillan Baltimore Johns Hopkins 1989) and Roger E Kanet and Edward A 
Kolodziej eds The Cold War as Cooperation Superpower Cooperation w Regional Conflict 
Management (London Macmillan Baltimore Johns Hopkins 1991) Substantial recent literature
2inability to mold the international environment to meet its own objectives Soviet new thinking 
concerning the Third World since about 1987 and Soviet behavior m the Third World since 
approximately 1989 indicate that much of what m the past was called the Soviet Grand Design has 
been abandoned m official policy The demands of domestic economic and political reform and the 
failures of earlier Soviet foreign policy activities are at the root of the changes that have occurred This 
applies to shifts m policy toward the Third World including regional security conflicts as well as in 
policy toward the USSR s erstwhile enemies in the industrialized world
The Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev has been m the process of entering the international 
political economic system from which it had attempted to isolate itself and to whose overthrow it was 
committed ever since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 It is abandoning its decades old commitment 
to a class based” foreign policy which has proven to be dangerous largely ineffectual and inordinately 
costly An integral part of this shift in Soviet perspective and policy on international politics involves 
a shift m perspective and policy concerning the developing world m general and Third World regional 
conflicts m particular
However at the very time that these new interpretations and objectives emerged in official Soviet 
policy the consensus that underlay Soviet foreign policy visibly eroded. Throughout 1990 for 
example former Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze responded most vehemently to those within the 
Soviet hierarchy who charged him and President Gorbachev with virtual capitulation to the West and 
giving away Soviet positions m Eastern Europe and throughout the Third World 4 The current lack 
of unity m foreign policy perspectives in the USSR and the dramatic moves away from reform by 
President Gorbachev by early 1991 make it far more difficult to project likely future Soviet policy 
Without this ability to predict the specific directions which might anse it becomes especially 
important to examine the general tendencies which may significantly influence future Soviet policy 
toward the Third World as well as the W est
The Brezhnev Legacy and the Gorbachev Reforms
At the height of the Brezhnev era m the mid 1970s Soviet optimism peaked concerning both the 
direction and pace of international developments and prospects for the expanded role of the USSR 
Developments of the pnor decade tended to support this viewpoint. The Soviet Union had closed the 
nuclear gap with the United States and had achieved strategic panty This panty and by extension 
Soviet equality as a global power had been recognized in a senes of agreements negotiated at 
Vladivostok Moscow and Helsinki The convenuonal forces of the Soviet Union in Europe as well
exists that examines aspects of Soviet mvolvement m Third World conflicts Among these are Roy 
Allison and Phil Wilhams eds Superpower Competition and Crisis Prevention in the Third World 
(Cambodge New York Cambridge University Press 1990) Bertil Dune r The Bear The Cubs and The 
Eagle Soviet Bloc Interventionism in the Third World and the US Response (Aldershot, UK Brookfield, 
VT Gower 1987) Karen A Feste ed American and Soviet Intervention Affects on World Stability 
(New York London Crane Russak, 1990) Francis Fukuyama, Gorbachev and the New Soviet Agenda m  
the Third World (Santa Momea, CA RAND Corporation, 1989) Gaka Golan, The Soviet Union and 
National Liberation Movements in the Third World (Boston London Unwm Hyman, 1988) Jin Valenta 
and Frank Cibulka, eds Gorbachev s New Thinking and Third World Conflicts (New Brunswick, NJ 
London Transaction Publishers 1990) and Jeanette Voas Preventing Future Afghanistans Reform in 
Soviet Policymaking on Military Intervention Abroad (Alexandria, VA Center for Naval Analyses 
1990)
4 See for example the comments of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze Vystuplenua na plenume TsK 
KPSS Pravda 8 February 1990 p 3 See also recent ameles by Andrei Kortunov Director of the 
Department of General Problems m Foreign Policy of the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada 
A Kortunov What is Meant by State Interests m Foreign Policy Literaturnaia gazeta 11 July 1990 
p 14 [translated in the current Digest o f the Soviet Press voi 42, no 30 (1990) pp 9 11] and A 
Kortunov and A Izyumov Clarifying Our National Interests m The Literary Gazette International voi 
1 no 14 (October 1990) pp 20 21
3as its expanded ability to project military power beyond its immediate borders had been enhanced by 
the modernization of Warsaw Pact faces and by the creation of an ocean going navy and long distance 
air transport capabilities
The West s acceptance at Helsinki of the postwar status quo m Europe the defacto defeat of the 
United States in Vietnam and the coming to power of self proclaimed Marxist Leninist national 
liberation movements throughout the Thud World—often with direct Soviet support—gave further 
evidence of the expanded role of the Soviet Union in world affairs In the international economic realm 
the Soviets envisaged the establishment of a socialist international division of labor that would fust 
counter and eventually replace the dominant capitalist world m arket5 Domestically econome growth 
rates though they had slowed since the immediate post war period süll enabled the Soviet leadership 
to fulfill its promises to meet growing consumer demands and simultaneously to mam tain the 
expanding military and economic commitments necessitated by its new role as a global power
Despite this Soviet optimism of the early 1970s and the apparent reality that underlay it, a decade 
later the Soviets increasingly found themselves internationally on the defensive The detente with the 
West, especially the United States had collapsed into a new cold war complete with economic 
embargo revitalized US military spending and a new US assertiveness m foreign policy Despite 
Soviet blustering Western European NATO states had agreed to the deployment of intermediate range 
nuclear weapons and the Reagan Administration had committed itself to the development of the 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI or Star Wars ) In short, a new round in the postwar arms race had 
begun
In the Thud World the USSR had been m effect, frozen out of participation m key developments 
in the Middle East and a number of its new allies/clients (Afghanistan Angola Ethiopia, Kampuchea 
and Nicaragua) had failed to create stable political economic systems and were increasingly challenged 
by domestic insurgencies supported by the United States and others The result was a growing demand 
for Soviet military and economic support including the direct takeover by Soviet troops of 
responsibility for the security of the Marxist Leninist regime in Afghanistan Along with this came 
criticism of Soviet intervention by a large number of developing countries In yet another area the 
Soviets found that the political attractiveness of their socio-economic political model had weakened 
dramatically The unity of the Soviet led World Communist Movement had shattered long ago In 
Western Europe communist parties had either lost domestic support or had asserted their independence 
from Moscow or both In the Thud World a grow mg number of Marxist regimes—e g  those in 
Benin Guinea Bissan and Mozambique—were modifying theu commitment to socialism and 
reestablishing or strengthening economic and political ties with the West
These problems arose at the very time when the weaknesses of the Soviet economy were becoming 
most apparent By the beginning of the 1980s economic growth rates had in the words of General 
Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev fallen to a level close to economic stagnation ” The technological gap 
between the Soviet economy and the economies of its major competitors including a number of 
Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) was expanding 6 After decades devoted to catching up with the
5 Alexei Kosygin, Direktivy XXIV S ezdu KPSS po piatiletnemu piami razvitua narodnogo khoziaistva 
SSR na 1971 1975 godu Pravda 7 April 1971 p 6 For comprehensive discussions of the place of 
national liberation movements m Soviet Third World policy see S Neil MacFarlane Superpower 
Rivalry and Third World Radicalism The idea o f National Liberation (Baltimore The Johns Hopkins 
University Press) pp 1985 Golan The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements m the Third 
World and Wayne P Limberg Soviet Military Support for Third World Marxist Regimes m Mark N 
Katz, ed. The USSR and Marxist Revolutions m the Third World (Cambridge New York Cambridge 
University Press 1990) pp 51 118
6 Mikhail S Gorbachev Perestroika New Thinking for Our Country and the World (New York. Harper 
and Row 1987) p 19 See also the analysis of Abel Aganbegyan, Gorbachev s Chief Economic 
Advisor m 1986 87 m The Economic Challenge o f Perestroika (Bloomington/London Indiana 
University Press 1988) pp 1 3 Aganbegyan argued that growth actually ceased in the period See
4West in a wide range of fields and of establishing themselves as a global power the Soviets now faced 
the prospect of stagnatimi and decime
Briefly the situation inherited by Brezhnev s successors was one filled with contradictions 
Although the Soviet Umon had emerged as a global superpower with wide ranging interests and 
capabilities this position was based largely on military power The nuclear stalemate with the United 
States the renewed activism of US policy and the expanding role of other countries in global affairs 
however precluded turning this enhanced military position into effective political gains The 
weaknesses of the Soviet economy raised questions about the possible overextension of international 
commitments and limited the relevance of the USSR for many of the most pressing of international 
problems—economic development, international trade and hard currency debts.
After assuming leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Mikhail 
Gorbachev spoke repeatedly of the domestic and foreign policy problems facing the USSR He 
committed himself to a major reform of the entire Soviet socio-economic political system as a means 
of resolving these problems The basic argument that he presented initially to support this reform can 
be summarized briefly as follows First the economic problems of the Soviet Union and the 
technology gap between the Soviet Union and the West were expanding and implied a decreasing ability 
of the Soviet economy to support the legitimate needs of the population or to insure the military 
security and global standing of the Soviet state in the twenty first century Second economic reform 
within the framework of socialism was essential in order to overcome the economic problems and 
technological weaknesses that threatened to undermine the USSR s international status required as well 
as a precondition for economic reform is a reform of the political process which will make officials 
more responsive to the needs of economic rationality 7 Third to overcome entrenched bureaucratic 
forces within the Soviet Union which would resist change a more open but still controlled political 
system that encourages criticism and rationality” in support of reform was required Finally policies 
were needed which would permit the Soviets to benefit more fully from advances m the international 
economy and to accomplish primarily by means other than military major Soviet foreign policy 
objectives In other words soon after coming to power Gorbachev and his advisors laid out the 
justification for perestroika glasnost (or openness) and democratization of the political process they 
also noted the interdependence of domestic reform and changes m Soviet foreign policy
In sum the primary objectives of Gorbachev s campaign of perestroika and glasnost were based 
on the recognition that the position of the USSR in the world depended upon a dramatic improvement 
in the functioning of the Soviet economy In his report to the 27th Party Congress m early 1986 he 
expressed this point most forcefully In a word Comrades acceleration of the country s economic 
development is the key to all our problems immediate and long term economic and social political 
and ideological domestic and foreign ”8 Perestroika became Gorbachev s call for major reform with the 
goal of revitalizing the economy closing the technology gap and turning the USSR into a fully 
competitive global superpower—not, to use Paul Dibb s term the incomplete superpower lacking 
virtually all but military power as an instrument to influence world developments 9
also Kazirmerz Poznanski Competition between Eastern Europe and Developing Countries in the 
Western Market for Manufactured Goods in Joint Economic Committee Congress o f The United. States 
East European Economies Slow Growth in the 1980s Volume 2 Foreign Trade and International 
Finance edited by John P Hardt and Richard F Kaufman (Washington U S Government Printing 
Office 1986) pp 162 90
7 Two well known Soviet analysts have developed precisely this argument See Alexei Izyumov and 
Andrei Kortunov The USSR in the Changing World, International Affairs no 8 (1988) pp 46 56
8 Mikhail S Gorbachev Politicheskii doklad Tsentral nogo Komiteta KPSS XXVII S ezdu 
Kommumsticheskoi Parta Sovetskogo Soiuza Doklad General nogo Sekretana TsK KPSS Tovarishcha 
Gorbacheva M S 25 Fevraha 1986 goda, Kommunist no 4 (1986) p 29
9 Dibb The Soviet Umon Incomplete Superpower
5As is clear from the vantage point of early 1991 the expectations of General Secretary Gorbachev 
and his advisors concerning their ability to turn around the Soviet economy have not been fulfilled 
The economy has continued to deteriorate Glasnost and democratization contributed both to the 
opening up of Soviet domestic politics and to the possible disintegration of a unified Soviet state and 
are now under relentless attack from conservative political elements In the foreign policy area 
although Gorbachev and his former foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze accomplished many of their 
objectives of improving relationships with the United States Western Europe and China, these goals 
have been accomplished, at times at substantial political cost They have also resulted in widespread 
opposition on the part of more conservative elements within the Soviet political system of the type 
that resulted in Shevardnadze s resignation In the remainder of this essay we shall examine the 
evolution of Soviet policy toward the developing world from 1985 to 1991
Gorbachev s Third World Policy From New Thinking to Foreign Policy Fragmentation
Between Gorbachev s rise to power in 1985 and 1991 Soviet policy toward the developing world went 
through three basic stages In the first period, which can be labeled the period of great expectations 
lasting from 1985 until approximately 1988 the promotion of new political thinking did not really 
coincide with a comparable change in policy or behavior The dominant Western response during this 
penod was that new thinking was largely tactical and did not represent a break with the grand design 
that had underlain Soviet policy in the past
The second penod, which was characterized by a flurry of new foreign policy initiatives from 
Cambodia m Southeast Asia to Nicaragua in Central America, lasted from 1988 until mid 1990 or so 
It was dunng this penod that the reality of the structural changes in Soviet policy in the Third World 
was increasingly recognized m the West—as well as the reality of changes in other aspects of Soviet 
foreign and domestic politics
The third penod of Soviet Third World policy began m 1990 and continues to the present In 
effect this is the penod m which any consensus on Soviet foreign policy has fragmented in which 
individual republics of the Soviet Union have attempted to assert their autonomy and in which the 
Soviet leadership has been forced to focus almost exclusively on domestic as opposed to foreign policy 
concerns Although new thinking continues to dominate official policy statements growing evidence 
has emerged of substantial opposition to various aspects of the new foreign policy including that m 
the developing world. The resignation of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze m December 1990 and the 
hard Ime anti Western attack on Western banks by the new pnme minister Valentin S Pavlov in 
February 1991 were evidence of this shift away from the roots of new thinking10
The Penod of Great Expectations
Before beginning our assessment of the implications of current developments in Soviet domestic and 
foreign policy for future Soviet behavior m the Third World it is essential to trace in more detail the 
evolution of Soviet policy dunng the three penods since Gorbachev s selection as head of the CPSU m 
March 1985 Although President Gorbachev dramatized the problems facing the Soviet Union m both 
the domestic and international arenas he was neither the first nor the only important Soviet personality 
to outline the need to turn the USSR around11 Already in his report to the 27th Party Congress m
10 See Francis X Cline Kremlin Accuses Banks m West of Plot, New York Times 13 February 1991 p 
13
11 In the foreign policy area analysts such as Karen Brutents and Evgenyi Primakov and others had 
questioned the assumptions of Soviet policy m the domestic area the need for dramatic reform was noted 
by Abel Aganbegyan, Tatiana Zaslovskaia, and others See for example Elizabeth K Valkenier The 
Soviet Union and the Third World An Economic Bind (New York Praeger 1983) p 26 the article by 
Tatiana Zaslovskaia that was first published as The Novosibirsk Report, Survey voi 28 (1984) pp
6February 1986 Goibachev gave some indication of the content of new political thinking when he raised 
issues seldom if ever discussed publicly by Soviet political leaders in the past The major points that 
he mentioned included recognition of the existence of global problems affecting all humanity that 
required cooperation on a world wide scale explicit stress on the interdependence of states the 
argument that it is no longer possible to wm an arms race or nuclear war for that matter and strong 
criticism of the infallibility complex that had characterized previous foreign policy12
New political thinking in the foreign policy area as interpreted early in the Gorbachev era, 
contained three basic components The first was a revitalization of Soviet foreign policy by rejecting 
the ngidity and the aggressiveness of Brezhnev s foreign policy and by appealing for greater flexibility 
in the implementation of policy and the reduction of the role of ideology m determining policy The 
second was the introduction of new concepts or issues on the agenda of the top leadership e g global 
problems and interdependence Third was a réévaluation of the sources of national security which led 
to the conclusion that 1) military especially nuclear panty would soon cease to be a factor of 
political military res tramt 2) national and international secunty had become m divisible 3) a multi 
faceted approach to problems of international secunty was required, and 4) international secunty was 
mutual or positive sum in nature
Goibachev s views drew heavily on those of academic analysts who already m the 1970s had 
begun discussing most of the issues that were to be placed on the agenda of the top political leadership 
after 1985 New thinking as these views were termed by Gorbachev became an integral element of 
Soviet assessments of developments in and policy toward the Third World While the 1961 Party 
Program had spoken with great optimism about prospects for liberation and the role of the USSR in 
supporting the national liberation struggle the 1986 Program emphasized the revitalization of neo­
colonialism and imperialism m the Third World and referred only to the fact that the CPSU supports 
the just struggle waged by the countries of Asia Africa and Latin America against imperialism 
Progressive states were informed that the tasks of building a new society were primarily their own 
responsibility although the Soviet Union would continue to render assistance where possible 13 The 
three major concerns raised about the Soviet involvement in the Third World related to the escalating 
costs borne by the Soviet Union in supporting clients the poor record of those clients after 
independence in creating stable political systems and functioning economies and the negative impact 
that involvement in the Third World had on other Soviet policy concerns—in particular relations with 
the United States
Thus by early 1986 the apparent official Soviet intention to reduce direct Soviet commitments to 
Third World clients was evident In addition to raising the issue of the cost of supporting Thud World 
allies the Soviets now questioned the long term viability of some of their client states and increasingly 
criticized the policies of some of these states Even such a strong supporter of the model of 
revolutionary democracy as Rostislav UI ïanovskii long time Deputy Director of the International 
Department of the CPSU now emphasized the extended and tortuous path that the building of
88 108 See also the discussion of early calls for reform in Ed A Hewett, Reforming the Soviet 
Economy Equality versus Efficiency (Washington The Brookings Institution 1988) pp 256 302
12 Gorbachev Politicheskn doklad, pages 18 19 36 and 41 For authoritative elaborations on new 
thinking see A N Iakovlev Dostizheme kachestvenno novogo sostoianna sovetskogo obshchestva i 
obshchestvennye nauki Vestmk Akademu Nauk SSSR no 6 (1987) pp 51 80 and Eduard 
Shevardnadze Report by Member of the Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the USSR Eduard Shevardnadze at the Scientific and Practical Conference of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs International Affairs no 10 (1988) pp 3 34 A Dobrynin, Za bez ïademyenyi mir 
navstrechu XXI Veku Kommunist no 9 (1986) esp pp 22 25 E Primakov Novaia filosofila 
vneshnei politila Pravda 10 July 1987 p 4 and A Bovin, Novoe myshleme—no vaia politika, 
Kommunist no 9 (1988) pp 115 125
13 Programma Kommumsticheskoi Partu Sovetskogo Soiuza, Pravda 2 November 1961 p 3 and The 
Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Umon A New Addition, New Times no 12 (1986) 
p 43
7socialism would en tail14 This new concern about Soviet policy m the Thud World had an important 
impact on a reconceptualization of regional conflicts and the most appropriate Soviet response to those 
conflicts In the past, Soviet analysts and politicians had charged that Western imperialism was the 
primary source of regional conflict The Soviets themselves it was argued had an obligation to 
support progressive groups throughout the Third World who were opposed by domestic opponents 
supported by the United States and its allies
Early in the Gorbachev era a new interpretation began to dominate official Soviet interpretations 
Gorbachev himself argued that regional conflicts m Asia Afinca, and Latin America are spawned by 
the colonial past new social processes or recurrences of predating policy or by all three The 
objective according to Gorbachev is to find a political not a military solution to these conflicts15 
Gorbachev went on to argue that every country has a nght to determine its own political orientation 
and that neither of the superpowers should intervene in domestic conflicts 16
Thus new thinking m relationship to the Third World as it emerged early in the Gorbachev era, 
implied 1) the demilitarization of regional conflicts and the search for political solutions to those 
conflicts 2) the de idealization or secularization of interstate relations and the basing of those 
relationships on mutual interests and 3) the refraining from violating the sovereignty of other nations 
including interference m domestic political debates
The initial Western reactions to new thinking as it applied to East West relations as well as to 
Soviet policy in the developing world was one of wait and see ” of cautious optimism For example 
Francis Fukuyama, who wrote extensively on this topic was very cautious in his conclusions about 
the long term implications of the new rhetoric that was applied to Soviet foreign policy17 The 
dominant initial Western interpretation of new thinking about the Third World could be summarized as 
follows at the level of public debate Soviet academic analysts and highly placed officials presented a 
much less optimistic and more complex interpretation of the Third World than that which had 
characterized expectations expressed during the Brezhnev years yet, the question remained whether this 
reassessment represented more than a mere tactical modification of Soviet doctrine or whether it could 
be interpreted as the external manifestation of a learning process in which the Soviet leadership was 
increasingly aware of its basic inability to mold the international environment to meet its often 
expressed objectives The question raised by most Western analysts therefore concerned the actual 
implementation of policy initiatives by the Soviet leadership that would move away from past policy
By 1987 the intellectual foundations for a shift m Soviet policy had been established however the 
question that then arose concerned the degree to which that new assessment influenced actual Soviet 
behavior It is necessary therefore to do a brief assessment of the second penod m Gorbachev s 
foreign policy toward the Third World, that in which the USSR engaged m a flurry of activity that 
resulted m a significant retrenchment of Soviet involvement and commitments Throughout 1988 and 
1989 the Soviet leadership initiated a number of important modifications in Thud World policy aimed 
at 1) reducing areas of conflict with the West 2) limiting the dram on Soviet resources and 3) 
extricating the USSR from regional conflicts in which the prospects for success seemed virtually
14 Rostislav U1 íanovsku O natsional not i revol mtsionnoi demokratu Puty evol îutsii Narody Azu i 
A fn k i no 2 (1984) p 16
15 Gorbachev Perestroika pp 173 174
16 Ibid pp 117 187 Evgenyi Pnmakov a key foreign policy advisor to Gorbachev throughout the 
entire penod since 1985 warned against viewing regional conflicts through a prism of American 
Soviet confrontation Evgenyi Pnmakov XXVII S ezd KPSS i issledovanie problem mirovoi 
ekonomiki i mezhdunarodnyh otnoshenn Mirovarua Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnoshemi 
(hereafter MEMO) no 5 (1986) p 12
17 See for example, Francis Fukuyama, Gorbachev and the Thud World, Foreign Affairs voi 64 no 4 
(1986) pp 715 731 The present author was also cautious m conclusions which he drew from the on 
gomg debate See Roger E Kanet Reassessmg Soviet Doctrine New Pnonties and Perspectives m 
Kolodziej and Kanet, eds The Limits o f Soviet Power tn the Developing World pp 416-417
8nonexistent During this period there was seemingly widespread support within the USSR for the 
implementation of new policies—at least there did not exist overt criticism of new thinking” or of 
the modification of foreign policy behavior associated with new thinking ” Politically the new 
interpretation maintained that Brezhnev s policy m the developing world had perpetuated confrontational 
elements m U S Soviet relations and had thereby contributed dramatically to the deterioration of the 
superpower relationship18 Secondly there was general agreement that Soviet commitments to client 
states throughout the Third World had resulted in escalating costs that contributed to the overall 
financial problems challenging the very foundations of the Soviet economy19
During 1988 and 1989 the Soviets moved forcefully on a variety of fronts to modify important 
elements of their past policy throughout the Third World Chief among these changes were the 
reassessment of security and economic commitments to radical Marxist Leninist regimes—as those m 
Afghanistan Angola and Ethiopia—that were challenged by internal opposition (often supported by the 
United States) as well as the economic assistance that had been committed to radical governments 
without seemingly havmg any positive impact on long term economic growth Finally questions 
were raised about the long term benefits to the USSR—or to recipients for that matter of the mqjor 
arms transfer programs of the Soviet state
New Foreign Policy Behavior
We turn now to a brief examination of the actual changes m Soviet Third World policy that occurred 
during 1988 1989 By far the most dramatic and significant of the changes in Soviet involvement in 
the Third World was the decision made in early 1988 and implemented by spring 1989 to withdraw 
Soviet combat troops from Afghanistan After initial efforts to pacify the country by conquest and to 
exert greater pressure on Pakistan to accept the new status quo in the region it soon became clear 
that the communist government of Afghanistan despite massive Soviet economic and military support 
and the direct involvement of well over 100 thousand Soviet troops was not capable of defeating the 
anti communist rebels The costs involved, both the military and the political costs as the USSR 
attempted to normalize relations with both the United States and China and the growing unrest at home 
in the face of escalating Soviet casualties contributed dramatically to the decision to withdraw It must 
be noted however that the Soviet Union did not abandon the government of Najibullah which it 
considered capable m the long term of stabilizing its control The commumst government of 
Afghanistan has continued to receive large amounts of economic and military support and has managed 
to stabilize its position for two full years after the departure of Soviet troops 20
In Southeast Asia, the Soviets contributed to the Vietnamese decision to withdraw combat troops 
from Cambodia by late 1989 21 In Angola the Soviets have contributed to the resolution of the 
conflict For example they played an important behind the scenes role in the negotiations which
18 See for example Viacheslav Dashichev Vostok Zapad Poisk novykh otnoshenn O pnontetakh 
vneshnei politila Sovetskogo Soiuza, Literaturnaia Gazeta 18 May 1988 p 14
19 See for example Charles Wolf et al The Costs o f Soviet Empire (Santa Momea, CA The RAND 
Corporation, 1983) p 19 See also Bons Ponomarev Real Socialism and the Liberated Countnes 
Slavo Lektora no 3 (1984) translated m Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Soviet Union, 
no 3 14 June 1984 pp 2 6 (annex) and comments by then Politburo member Gaidar Aliev during a 
visit to Hanoi See Pravdmk narodov pobratimov mitmg Sovetskogo V etnamskogo druzhby 
Pravda 1 November 1983 p 5
20 For a discussion of this issue, see Marvin G Wembaum Superpower Cooperation m Southwest Asia, 
m Kanet and Kolodziej eds The Cold War as Cooperation, pp 310 340
21 For details on recent Soviet policy in Southeast Asia see Sheldon Simon, Superpower Cooperation in 
Southeast Asia, m Kanet and Kolodziej eds The Cold War as Cooperation pp 341 368 See also 
Suzanne Crow Will the Moscow Hanoi Alliance Survive Aid and Arms Cutbacks7 Report on the USSR 
voi 2 no 45 (1990) pp 14 17
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resulted in the Cuban decision to withdraw more than two-thirds of their troops from Angola.22 
Initially as m Afghanistan the Gorbachev leadership had apparently hoped for a military solution to 
the civil war However when it became obvious that the Popular Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola (MPLA) was unable to assert full control over Angola the Soviets pushed strongly for the 
negotiations that resulted in a ceasefire and the significant reduction of Cuban troops m Angola 23
To a substantial degree Soviet policy m Ethiopia paralleled that in other Marxist Leninist states 
where civil war challenged the central government authorities Although Soviet military aid to 
Ethiopia was not significantly reduced as of early 1991 Soviet officials had announced their intention 
to reduce their mvolvement m the Ethiopian civil w ar24
In Central America a parallel development occurred as the Soviets first encouraged the Sandmistas 
m Nicaragua to permit an open and competitive election and later accepted what, for them were the 
very negative results of that election 23 Overall during 1988 and 1989 the Soviet Union either 
encouraged or accepted a senes of developments m relationships with Marxist Leninist client states 
throughout the Third World that resulted m their military withdrawal the beginnings of a negotiated 
solution to a long standing conflict or the reduction of their overall military and economic 
commitment to a client regime
In many respects the parallels to developments in Eastern Europe are striking Moreover the 
motivations for the shift in Soviet policy parallel those at work in Eastern Europe First the decision 
had been made by the Gorbachev leadership that the costs of empire—that is the economic and pohucal 
costs of maintaining a dominant position in Eastern Europe and/or areas of the Third World simply 
outweighed the benefits to be achieved. This motivation for permitting the collapse of communist 
regimes m East-Central Europe was made clear by former Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze 26 
The motive has also been evident m relations with Third World clients which were among the weakest 
and least stable of governments throughout the developing world. Moreover continued mvolvement m 
regional conflicts are now viewed as one of the key inhibiting factors to a normalization of relations 
with the industrialized West and the entrance of the USSR into the international political and economic 
community The latter has been viewed by Soviet reformers as an essential element of the overall 
reform process and the revitalization of the economy 27
Closely associated with the shift away from strong support of and major mvolvement in regional 
conflicts has been the questioning of the cost and long term value to the USSR of both the military 
and economic relationships that have been established ever since the mid 1950s For example an 
editorial m Izvestua in early 1990 provided specific information on the size and nature of the debt to 
the USSR O f the total 85 8 billion rubles owed to the Soviet Union through 1 November 1989 37 2 
billion was owed by socialist developing countries and an additional 42 billion rubles by other 
developing countries
22 See Kubintsy ukhodyat ïz Angoly Izvestua 3 September 1990
23 See Richard Weitz, Moscow and its African Allies Report on the USSR voi 3 no 6 (February 8 
1991) pp 8 11 See also Vladimir I Dikhomirov The USSR and South Africa An End to Total 
Onslaught 7 Africa Report voi 34 no 4 (1989) pp 58 61
24 See for example Richard O Regan, Soviets Fed up With Bickering Will Quit Arming Ethiopian War 
The Atlanta Journal and Constitution 5 March 1990 p A 9 Jane Perlez Ethiopian Government Seen 
as Fighting to Survive The New York Times 17 April 1990 p A 5
25 See W Raymond Duncan, Superpower Cooperation in the Caribbean and Central America, in Kanet 
and Kolodziej eds The Cold War as Cooperation, pp 245 246
26 See for example Shevardnadze Vystupleuua na plenume TsK KPSS p 3
27 For a discussion of changing perceptions of the USSR on regional conflicts see among others Andrei I 
Kolosovskn Regional nye konflikty i global naia bezopasnost MEMO  no 6 (1988) pp 32-41 
and Aleksandr K Kislov Novoe politicheskoe myshlenie i regional nye konflikty MEMO no 8 
(1988) pp 39-47
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TABLE 1 Outstanding Debts Owed to the USSR as of 1 November 1989
Countries In millions o f rubles
Socialist countries
Socialist developmg countries (Cuba, North Korea, Laos Mongolia, Vietnam) 37 156 8
Other socialist countries 6 649 1
Subtotal socialist countries 43 805 9
Developmg countries
Progressive countries (Angola, Afghanistan, Benin, Cambodia, Ethiopia, 
Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Nicaragua, South Yemen ) 9 469 8
Major non socialist developmg countries (Algeria, Egypt, India, Iraq Libya, Syna) 25 783 6
Other developmg countries 6 786 3
Subtotal developmg countries 42 039 7
Total outstanding Debt 85 845 6
Source Unikal nyi dokument Izvestua 1 March 1990 page 3
The article made clear that the amounts owed to the USSR were not likely to be repaid quickly 
enough to help the Soviet economy Another Soviet author writing in Izvestua m mid 1990 noted 
that the amount owed to the USSR was the result of economic ideological and military political 
miscalculations This author was highly critical of past Soviet policy and interpreted a July 1990 
decree of President Gorbachev calling for the implementation of the principles of mutual advantage m 
economic relations with the Soviet Union with all partners as a move in the nght direction 28
There have been those who have for all practical purposes argued that the USSR should abandon 
virtually all commitments throughout the Third World and focus exclusively on the solution of 
domestic problems This is the position taken for example by Andrei Kolosov who has complained 
that, although Soviet partners tend to be authoritarian political leaders not committed to the peaceful 
resolution of conflict they continue to receive Soviet political military and economic backing 
Kolosov concludes that the USSR must encourage these leaders to negotiate the settlement of internal 
conflicts and should also move away from relying almost exclusively on military support to Third 
World clients and establish relationsiups m which economic expediency not ideological and political 
preferences should become the determinant for developing economic ties with the Third World as 
w ell”29
On the other hand there are those who strongly criticize the extreme position of Kolosov and 
others For example Andrei Umov Deputy Chief of the International Department of the Central 
Committee of the CPSU criticizes Kolosov for his extreme position and argues that although one 
might criticize past aspects of Soviet foreign policy one simply cannot accept Kolosov s view that all 
Soviet allies are venal or that their opponents (such as Pol Pot m Cambodia, RENAMO in 
Mozambique or the Eritrean separatists m Ethiopia) are morally supenor30
In sum from 1988 until sometime m early 1990 the Soviet Umon pursued a number of policy 
changes which resulted m a reorientation of its policies in key conflict regions throughout the Thud
28 Elena Arefeva, Miloserdie ill vse zhe ldeologua? Izvestua 24 July 1990 p 1
29 Andrei Kolosov Reappraisal of USSR Third World Policy International Affairs no 5 (1990) pp 34 
42 citation from p 41
30 Andrei Umov T he Third World and the USSR International Affairs no 8 (1990) pp 69 73 See also 
L Z Zevm and E L Simonov Pomoshch i ekonomicheskoe sotrudmchestvo SSSR s 
razvivaiushchimisia stranami uroki problemy i perspektivy Narody Azu i Afriki no 2 (1990) pp
5 17 Zevm and Simonov see good prospects for the expansion of beneficial economic relations for the 
Soviet Umon m trade with developing countries and argue that it would be foolish for the USSR to 
isolate itself from the long term benefits possible from these relationships
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World It began as well to reduce commitments to some of its established allies New thinking had 
indeed evolved into new behavior patterns But were these behavior patterns really that new'? Canone 
really argue that the Soviet Union was on the verge of withdrawing from the Third World9 In 
responding to these quesuons one must take into account the fact that the apparent foreign consensus 
on foreign policy that characterized the USSR in the first two penods of the Gorbachev era broke down 
during 1990 and has beai immersed m the increasingly vitriolic debates that have characterized Soviet 
political processes whether they concern economic reform constitutional changes ethnic relations or 
virtually any other aspect of domestic politics m the Soviet Union
Fragmentation of Foreign Policy Consensus
It is ironic that at the very time when the USSR could expect to begin benefiting from the changes it 
had initiated in its foreign policy the domestic consensus on that policy had already begun to fragment 
Soviet policy in Asia, Africa and Latin America during the last years of the 1980s resulted in a rapid 
reassessment in the West of the nature of Soviet foreign policy and the prospect of the USSR entering 
the international community as an equal and beneficial contributor to the emergence of a new 
international order While political leaders and political analysts m the West praised the Gorbachev 
leadership for its pragmatic and beneficial approach to regional conflicts and other foreign policy 
concerns—witness especially the early stages of the Persian Gulf conflict—voices emerged in the 
Soviet Union that condemned Gorbachev his foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze and other reformers 
for a foreign policy of capitulation Thus began the third stage of Gorbachev s policy toward the Third 
World, a period of growing intonai confrontation within the USSR itself and a period of division 
concerning the very roots of foreign policy and of a gradual weakening of the position of reformers 
that, pnor to the end of 1990 resulted in Shevardnadze s resignation
Throughout 1990 the debate on Soviet foreign policy became extremely vocal and heated. 
Shevardnadze the architect of much of this new foreign policy was the target of extremely critical 
comments by those who charged him and Gorbachev with having abandoned the security interests of 
the USSR in Central Europe by permitting even encouraging the demise of Marxist Leninist regimes 
and unilaterally committing the Soviet Union to the withdrawal of its troops from the region 
Elsewhere Shevardnadze and Gorbachev were accused of abandoning the interests of their allies 
throughout the Third World.
The conservative attacks on Gorbachev s internal domestic and foreign policy reforms that emerged 
by early 1990 did not signify a unified opposition Rather they derived from a variety of groups 
whose interests did not always coincide except increasingly in the fact that they opposed the reforms 
being considered or implemented in domestic economic and political relations as well as in the foreign 
policy arena. To a substantial degree Gorbachev and the reform leaders ignored the initial and sporadic 
offensive of the conservatives—those who opposed domestic decentralization and democratization the 
emergence of political pluralism the reduction of Soviet international commitments and the decrease 
in Soviet military capabilities31 By 1990 however these attacks became so frequent and all 
encompassing that responses were required Aleksandr Iakovlev one of Gorbachev s three primary 
lieutenants noted that the primary danger to the successful introduction of perestroika came from the 
conservatives32 Shevardnadze responded that the conservative criticisms of Gorbachev s foreign policy 
had the objective of discrediting the entire leadership and undermining the foundations of reform in the 
USSR 33
31 To be sure, there were those who criticized the Gorbachev leadership for moving too cautiously in 
reforming both domestic and foreign policy
32 See the interview with Aleksandr Iakovlev m Literaturnaia gazeta no 1 3 January 1990
33 Eduard Shevardnadze V mire vse mimaetsia s golovokruzhitel noi bystrotvi Interv iu na bortu 
samoleta, Izvestua  19 February 1990 p 5
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This opposition to new political thinking and Gorbachev s foreign policy has fallen into three 
broad groupings 34 The first, who can be called statists ” consist of members of the party apparatus 
and the dogmatic wing of the party as well as some senior military officers and writers A second 
group the national Bolsheviks ” also fmd their supporters in the party apparatus and within the 
military The third group the ‘Russian nationalists include members of the Russian intelligence 
who range from moderate nationalists to the extremists associated with the nght wing organization 
‘Pam iat” Though none of these groups has a well developed, integrated foreign policy perspective or 
program nor an organizational structure they are highly critical of recent developments in Soviet 
foreign policy—m particular of the collapse of Marxist Leninist regimes in Eastern Europe and the 
implications that this might have for the erosion of internal authority within the USSR itself The 
views of all three groupings are influenced both by positive perceptions of the Russian/Soviet imperial 
past and by fears of the dangers to Russia/the USSR that emanate from the outside world
In fact, from the very beginning there were within the party apparatus some who did not accept the 
underlying principles or assumptions of new thinking For example there were those within the 
Party apparatus who opposed the replacement of class interests with universal human values as a basis 
for the foreign policy of the USSR35 While the earlier criticism occurred at the level of Marxist 
philosophy and ideology and appeared m specialized publications more recently the criticisms by 
noted Russian writers of new thinking and behavior m the foreign policy area has occurred in the mass 
circulation press For example one Soviet writer sees in the concept of general human values a 
temble mistake” that contributed to the dangerous developments m Eastern Europe36 Another has 
argued that new thinking abandoned the interests of the socialist state and abandoned efforts to oppose 
bourgeois imperialist expansion throughout the Third World The idea of integration into Europe is 
presented as dangerous for the very existence of the USSR37
In response to the charge that the USSR was abandoning the Third World Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze noted in an interview m spring 1990 that it was true that the Soviet Union was in the 
process of reducing the intensity of some of its Third World contacts He argued, however that 
without solving its domestic economic problems the Soviet Union would be m no position to help 
developing countries in the future He noted as well that in most of the regional conflicts to which 
the USSR had been a party military solutions simply did not ex ist38
Shevardnadze s resignation announced at a meeting of the Congress of People s Deputies on 20 
December 1990 brought to an end what two well known and influential Soviet analysts have called the 
creative destruction stage of Gorbachev era foreign policy *39 Once again Shevardnadze responded to 
the attacks of conservative critics who charged him with contributing to the demise of socialism 
though he also noted his concerns about the erosion of democracy and reemergence of dictatorship 
within the USSR 40 In responding earlier in the year to charges by CPSU conservatives that 
Gorbachev s policies had resulted in the loss of Eastern Europe ” Shevardnadze had stated
34 The following discussion benefits from Olga Alexandrova s Konservative Opposition gegen das neue 
politische Denken Aktuelle Analysen no 22/1990 21 March 1990 Bundesinstitut fu r 
ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien
35 See for example I Usachev Obshche-chelovecheskoe i klassovoe v mirovoi politike Kommunist 
no 11 (1988) pp 109 118
36 Anatoly i Saluzkn m the discussion Kakoi byt Rosa7 Sovetskaia Kul tura no 8 (24 February 1990) 
P 4
37 Aleksandr Prokhanov Tragedua centralizma, Literatumaia Rossua no 1 (5 January 1990) pp 4 5
38 Press konferentsna E A Shevardnadze Pravda 27 March 1990 p 5
39 Alexei Izyumov and Andrei Kortunov The End of New Thinking Newsweek, 31 December 1990 p 
54
40 Shevardnadze Resigns at 20 Dec Congress Session, Moscow Radio domestic service m Russian, 1200 
GMT 20 December 1990 translated m F BIS Sov 20 December 1990 pp 11 12
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‘Perestroika is not responsible for the destruction of the political structure of Europe It was destroyed 
by the will of peoples no longo* willing to put up with oppression The undermining of faith in 
socialism based on suppression and violence began in the 1940s not in 1985 41
By 1990 the debilitating problems of a deteriorating economy a chaotic society and the inability 
of government or party to deal with either resulted m growing attention on the part of Gorbachev to 
domestic developments At the same time the consensus on foreign policy insofar as it had existed, 
began to fragm ent No longer was there agreement on the goals of Soviet foreign policy or the means 
by which to implement them42 In addition to the divisions on foreign policy noted above there 
emerged autonomous foreign policy constituencies and actors such as die autonomous Umon 
Republics that by 1990 had begun to pursue their own foreign policy interests—often at odds with 
those of the all Union government In addition to the foreign policy activities of the Union Republics 
various branches of the bureaucracy and the armed forces began to express their idiosyncratic concerns 
as these related both to domestic and foreign affairs 43
It is essential to recall that two forces have driven the Soviet Union to its current impasse m the 
foreign policy area, including its policies toward the Third World The first is the growing domestic 
crisis which requires Gorbachev and the leadership increasingly to disengage from the international 
arena, particularly throughout the Thud World in order to concentrate more time and resources on 
internal problems The key element of Gorbachev s response has been his gradual shift to the nght, as 
he has searched for supporters among conservative elements within the party and state apparatus 
Secondly the forces of glasnost and perestroika which were initially unleashed by Gorbachev to 
provide solutions to deep-seated economic and political problems have increasingly fragmented the 
domestic and foreign policy process This in turn has eroded Gorbachev s ability to formulate and 
implement coherent and consistent foreign policy A good illustration of the shift in Soviet policy can 
be seen m the USSR s position on the Gulf crisis—from whole hearted support for the U S led 
international coalition m August 1990 to more conditional support and the effort to pursue 
autonomous policies by the time actual fighting broke out in January February 1991
Future Prospects of the USSR s Third World Policy
The end of the Cold War the substantial reorientation of Soviet foreign policy over the last three years 
as well as the internal political and economic upheavals within the USSR and the fragmentation of the 
consensus on foreign policy all make it extremely difficult to provide any specific projections about 
likely developments m Soviet policy over the next decade and beyond, into the next century However 
several issues appear to be relatively clear as they impinge upon Soviet foreign policy including that 
toward the countries of Asia Africa, and Latin America First the collapse of an internal consensus on 
foreign policy and the reemergence of extremely conservative voices of those who view the policies of 
the recent past largely as a form of capitulation and self initiated defeatism do not augur well for a 
continuation of the type of cooperation i n U S  Soviet relations that emerged during 1989 90 In the 
wake of the Gulf War for example there have been those within the Soviet military establishment 
who have advocated a significant mercase m the commitment of Soviet resources to weapons 
development to counter the apparent superiority of US and Western weapons systems to Soviet 
weapons at least when employed by Iraqi military forces Moreover there have been those who have 
argued that former Foreign Minister Shevardnadze tied Soviet interests far too closely to those of the 
United States In his first months m office Aleksander Bessmertnykh Shevardnadze s successor
41 E Shevardnadze Vystuplenna na plenume TsK KPSS p 3
42 See for example, Kortunov and Izyumov What is Meant by State Interests in Foreign Policy
43 For a discussion of the fragmentation of Soviet foreign policy constituencies see Tamara J Rester
National Assertiveness and Foreign Policy in the USSR unpublished paper presented at the annual 
meetings of the International Studies Association, Vancouver B C 19 23 March 1991 See also Jan 
Arveds Trepans Baltic Foreign Policy m 1990 Report on the USSR voi 3 no 2 (1991) pp 15 18
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attempted to distance himself and the USSR from such close association with the U S —especially in 
the Gulf War
Do these and related developments imply that the Soviet Umon is on the verge of entering into a 
new round of active and expansionist involvement throughout the Third World or more generally that 
the USSR may well reemerge over the next decade as a direct challenger to US and Western interests as 
it had been for more than forty years after the conclusion of World War II7 The answer to this question 
is by no means clear Yet there are factors that seem to mitigate against a renewal of large scale Soviet 
suppôt for radical regimes and revolutionary movements throughout the Third World First, the 
political conditions in the Third World itself do not appear conducive to prospects for Marxist 
revolution on a level with what occurred during the 1970s European colonialism a primary 
contributor to past revolutionary activities has largely disappeared Moreover the socialist model of 
socio economic development has lost its appeal given the fact that it has failed to accomplish its 
objectives anywhere in the world. Moreover economic privatization and political democratization are 
attracting more support throughout the developing world than they have m the past Thus the 
political conditions throughout the Third World at the beginning of the 1990s do not seem conducive 
to the reemergence of radical Marxist movements on a broad scale
A second set of issues that will influence Soviet foreign policy concerns the state of relations 
between the USSR and the United States So long as the Soviet leadership is committed to a policy of 
economic revitalization which depends heavily upon cooperation in the economic realm with the United 
States and other Western industrial countries widespread support for radical movements in the Third 
World is highly unlikely The demise of the Cold War has meant that regional conflicts are not likely 
to lead to increased U S Soviet tension and the detente m U S Soviet relations has been viewed as an 
essential element in the overall revitalization of the Soviet economy Cordial relations—or at least 
non hostile relations—with the West and the United States in particular should remain an essential 
component of an overall foreign policy strategy of any Soviet government over the next decade as the 
USSR attempts to bnng its domestic economic and political situation under control Thus it would 
appear that no Soviet leadership—even a conservative one—would be interested in pursuing a policy 
that would result in a dramatic deterioration of East West relations or the possibility of a reemergent 
Cold War
A third set of developments that will greatly influence Soviet foreign policy during the 1990s 
including that toward developmg countries will be the political and economic situation within the 
USSR itself Presently political fragmentation and economic collapse must be the primary factors on 
which any Soviet leadership will concentrate Involvement m overseas adventures will be highly 
unlikely given the attention and resources that must be devoted to rebuilding the Soviet state—if the 
continued existence of that state is still a possibility This does not mean that should a hard hne 
conservative faction come to power within the Soviet Union relationships with the West might not 
deteriorate What it does mean is that even a hard Ime conservative Soviet government would likely 
not have the resource base m the foreseeable future from which to remitíate the kind of expansionist 
and aggressive policies that characterized Soviet policy in the last decade of the Brezhnev penod
Thus the overall conclusion that we reach is that domestic and foreign costs will continue to 
enter seriously into considerations whether or not to pursue particular opportunities” for the pursuit of 
Soviet interests overseas Given the present domestic crisis four types of opportunism are envisaged 
First, low cost, high return opportunism revolving behind the scenes efforts to resolve conflicts to 
pressure allies or clients to join the bandwagon of international opinion and to establish new relations 
with states that can promote Soviet domestic prosperity without alienating traditional allies or clients 
who remare valued assets To some extent the Soviet efforts during the Gulf Crisis to maintain ties 
with Iraq to strengthen relationships with the government of Iran while still providing general support 
for the UJSÍ coalition seem to fall into this category A second category might be termed no cost 
high profile opportunism re which the USSR would pursue global and regional initiatives or calls 
geared to peace and cooperation The mediating role that the USSR played at the conclusion of the 
Indo Pakistani War of 1965 is an illustration of this type of policy
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There is also a question of lost opportunities” if the Soviet foreign policy process continues to 
fragment m terms of both domestic participants and the orientation of Soviet foreign policy It is 
important to recognize that this process fragmentation could result m a foreign policy process akin to 
that of the United States where pluralism leads to compromise and consensus On the other hand it 
could also result m anarchy and chaos and in the overall undermining of the authority of any unified 
Soviet state In either of these two cases however the issues to be decided will involve whether or not 
new thinking” m the foreign policy area can offer a viable alternative to the old Soviet Grand 
D esign” Finally there will be opportunities that the Soviet leadership simply will not be able to 
ignore ” because they will contribute directly and clearly to strengthening the national sovereignty of 
the Soviet state or they represent opportunities to be gamed with little or no cost.
It appears evident that throughout the Soviet political spectrum almost mdependent of political 
orientation there exists a recognition that future Soviet involvement in the Third World must be more 
cost-effective and must contribute directly and immediately to the interests of the USSR Even those 
within the Soviet establishment who have opposed the call for virtually complete Soviet withdrawal 
from the Third World, recognize the inordinately high costs of past Soviet mvolvement and the modest 
returns that the USSR has derived from those involvements
The USSR will not likely make commitments to revolutionary movements or regimes throughout 
the Third World on a par with those made in the past However—and this is a point that must be kept 
in mind—even during the high point of new thinking during 1988 1989 the USSR did not abandon 
all of its Third World commitments Although the Soviet leadership has reassessed its Thud World 
commitments it has not abandoned fully formed Leninist governments such as those in Vietnam 
Afghanistan and Ethiopia Soviet military and economic support has continued to flow to these 
regimes although direct mvolvement has been reduced (especially in Afghanistan)44 What the USSR 
has done is reduce its commitments to regimes considered unlikely to achieve any degree of stability 
especially in situations where continued direct mvolvement and support was likely to undermine the 
attempt to improve relations with China and/or the United States 45
In conclusion the position from which the USSR will pursue its interests in the Thud World has 
changed dramatically since the penod in the 1970s when the Soviet Union appeared to hold a 
significantly advantageous position versus the United States because 1) revolution was rampant 
throughout the Thud World, 2) the United States was immobilized in the aftermath of its disastrous 
experiences in Vietnam and 3) the acquisition of nuclear military panty by the Soviet Umon created an 
environment that contnbuted to a strengthening of Soviet expansionist dnves
In all of these areas the situation has changed dramatically for the USSR The 1990s will likely 
see the Soviet Union—whether three ted by political leaders committed to a continuation of domestic 
reforms or by a more hard Ime leadership attempting to restore central controls over both the economy 
and the polity—pursuing policies of modest mvolvement that will contnbute to the strengthening of 
the domestic Soviet economy
44 See Janus Bugajski Perestroika in the Third World, The Fletcher Form o f World Affairs voi 15 no 1 
(1991) pp 93 110 Bugajski concludes that the disintegration of communist regimes throughout the 
Third World cannot be considered either universal or inevitable (p 103) For similar conclusions see 
Manan Leighton Moscow s Thud World Empue Global Affairs voi 5 no 2 (1990) pp 133 156 
esp at pp 152 153 and William E Gnffith, Gorbachev s Policies Toward the Thud World, m Mark N 
Katz, ed. The USSR and Marxist Revolutions m the Third World (Cambndge New York Cambodge 
University Press 1990) p 142
45 On the issue of continued Soviet support to established Marxist Leninist regimes see S Neil 
MacFarlane LURSS et les Regimes marxistes Léninistes au Tiers Monde en Afrique Subsahanenne et 
en Amérique Latine m La Politique Etrangère Soviétique a L  Aube des Années 90 ed. by Claude Basset 
(Quebec Centre québécois de Relations Internationales Collection CHOIX 1990) pp 128 136
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